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ABSTRACT
The effects of geography and productivity on the global pattern of production are captured here in
a specific factors gravity model. Simple enough for sharp results, the model is yet rich enough to contain
the high dimensional productivity frictions in production and distribution of a many country world.
The starting point is the international incidence of productivity frictions inferred from gravity. Sellers’
and buyers’ incidence both reduce real income. Sellers’ incidence shocks reduce sectoral skill premia.
Bigger sellers’ incidence by country (sector) reduces equilibrium shares of world (national) GDP.
In contrast to the generalized Ricardian gravity model of Eaton and Kortum (2002), relative factor
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james.anderson.1@bc.eduGeography obviously has big eﬀects on the global pattern of income and production. But
geography has been diﬃcult to capture in models simple enough to apply yet rich enough
to reﬂect the high dimensionality of distribution frictions in a many country world. A key
diﬃculty is that frictions in the productivity of both distribution and production impact
production and expenditure patterns through their incidence on buyers and sellers. This
paper applies the incidence measures of the structural gravity model to a many-countries-
many-goods speciﬁc factors general equilibrium model of resource allocation. It provides a
very sharp characterization of the eﬀect of gravity’s incidence on on production patterns,
real incomes and internal income distribution.
The structural gravity model yields convenient operational measures of buyers’ and sell-
ers’ incidence of productivity frictions in distribution, aggregated over trade partners at the
sectoral level. See Anderson and Yotov (2008) for details and evidence on the incidence of
trade costs of 2 digit sectors in Canada’s provinces.1 Their evidence shows that buyers’ or
sellers’ incidence is weakly, sometimes negatively correlated with Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) type measures, so the latter may be very misleading when the purpose of the analysis
requires incidence. Incidence falls mostly (3 to 5 times more) on the supply side and its vari-
ation is large across countries and across sectors within countries. Most strikingly, sellers’
incidence falls over time (1992-2003) despite constant gravity coeﬃcients, due to changing
shipment shares. This ﬁnding suggests the importance of modeling causation running from
incidence to shipment shares, the focus of this paper.
The model features the incidence of TFP frictions that combine sectoral distribution
frictions with Hicks neutral productivity frictions in production. In contrast to TFP, which
is deﬁned at constant prices, incidence decomposes TFP into its impact on buyers’ and
sellers’ prices throughout the global economy. The applied literature has by default used
partial equilibrium TFP measures of the eﬀects of geography. For example, Redding and
Venables (2004) link the pattern of production to TFP-type measures in distribution while
1See Anderson (1979) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) for further discussion of the structural
gravity model.the large literature on openness and comparative performance has used measures that at
best (e.g., land-lockedness) instrument for TFP in distribution.
The main focus of the paper is the eﬀect of sellers’ incidence on resource allocation.
Resource allocation across sectors in each national economy can be modeled without regard
to distribution over trade partners within sectors under trade separability (Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2004): national varieties form separable groups in preferences and technology in
each sector, and distribution requires resources in the same proportions as does production
(iceberg trade costs). Full general equilibrium arises when the intra- and inter-sectoral
modules are mutually consistent.
Standard general equilibrium production theory yields only weak results in the form
of a positive correlation between sellers’ prices and sectoral output. The speciﬁc factors
production model developed here provides much sharper results in closed form solutions
that provide intuitive insight into how geography shapes economic outcomes. In addition to
this modeling advantage, speciﬁc factors provide descriptive realism in that export intensity
is correlated in the model with sectoral wage premia.
There are two factors of production in the main version of the model. Unskilled labor
is intersectorally mobile. Skilled labor is mobile prior to production as well, but it acquires
sector speciﬁc attributes between allocation and use in production. After sector speciﬁc skills
are acquired, productivity shocks are realized, the ex post eﬃcient allocation of unskilled la-
bor occurs, resulting in production and consumption at world market clearing prices. Neither
factor of production is internationally mobile. The market structure is competitive in the
main body of the paper; monopolistic competition is treated in the Appendix. The tractabil-
ity of the model makes it suitable for adaptation to empirical work on the one hand and to
theoretical reﬁnement on the other hand. Extensions of the basic model here to many spe-
ciﬁc factors, intermediate goods, selection to exporting and monopolistic competition retain
the main qualitative properties of the simpler model.
The equilibrium (multi-) factoral terms of trade are negatively related across countries to
2country size and to the sellers’ incidence of TFP, and positively related to allocative eﬃciency.
Eﬀective country size is the ratio of potential GDP to aggregate sellers’ incidence of TFP
frictions, as if frictions melt away a portion of potential GDP. Equilibrium Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is increasing in eﬀective country size with elasticity between zero and one,
due to the terms of trade eﬀect of country size. Real incomes are additionally reduced by
the buyers’ incidence of TFP. Looking across sectors within a country, the sector speciﬁc
skill premium is reduced by high sellers’ incidence of productivity frictions. Equilibrium
production shares are increasing in sector speciﬁc factor endowments and goods/variety
taste parameters, and decreasing in the equilibrium sellers’ incidence of TFP frictions.
The eﬃcient ex ante allocation of skilled labor is characterized under risk neutrality.
Looking across countries, given ex ante eﬃciency, higher variance of the incidence of pro-
ductivity shocks lowers ex post production eﬃciency, as is intuitive. It is plausible that the
national variance of the incidence rises with the mean, implying that ex post ineﬃciency
is larger for economies with higher average trade costs. Within countries, higher sectoral
variance raises ex ante eﬃcient skill allocations under risk neutrality because sector speciﬁc
factor returns are convex in productivity.
The closest related model is that of Eaton and Kortum (2002). They embed gravity
in a Ricardian model of trade featuring productivity diﬀerences resulting from draws from
nationally diﬀering Frechet distributions. In equilibrium the model is observationally equiv-
alent to the one good/many varieties gravity model (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004).
Costinot and Komunjer (2007) extend the Eaton-Kortum framework to a multi-good setting.
The speciﬁc gravity model here nests the Costinot-Komunjer model as a special case when
the eﬃcient allocation of skilled labor is made after the realization of productivity draws.2
The speciﬁc factors model has several advantages in descriptive power relative to the
generalized Ricardian model. First, unlike the Ricardian model it is consistent with import-
competing production, action on the intensive margin and the attendant political economy
2Inessentially, the nesting applies to a monopolistic competition version of the Eaton-Kortum-Costinot-
Komunjer models and the speciﬁc gravity model.
3of protection. Second, it features an empirically realistic income distribution. Ex post speci-
ﬁcity combines with productivity shocks to generate the well documented phenomenon of
sectorally heterogeneous returns to otherwise identical skilled labor, positively correlated
with export intensity.3 Finally, the model allows a role for relative factor endowment diﬀer-
ences in explaining the pattern of production and trade. An important aspect is the ex ante
allocative eﬃciency of he ex post speciﬁc factor. Other advantages not exploited here include
linkage to the interest group political economy model of trade policy. The tractability of the
model suggests that it is a useful platform for future development, especially for empirical
applications.
A less closely related recent literature that seeks to explain the pattern of production by
international diﬀerences in endowments and technology lacks an appropriate general treat-
ment of trade costs. Davis and Weinstein (2001) use the multi-cone Heckscher-Ohlin contin-
uum of products model, but eﬀectively assume that all the incidence of trade costs is on the
demand side. Romalis (2004) considers the role of uniform trade costs in resource allocation
using the multi-cone Heckscher-Ohlin continuum model, but in a North-South model with
M identical countries in each half of the world. Trade costs disappear from his empirical
work via a substitution that is valid only using the high degree of uniformity of the model.
Treﬂer’s HOV model (1995) allows for technology diﬀerences and home bias in preferences,
but the home bias is not connected with gravity.
Section 1 sets the stage by describing and distinguishing between TFP and its incidence
in a global economy. It describes how the supply side incidence of trade and productivity
frictions ﬁt into a standard general model of production, yielding the usual weak correlation
relationship between sellers’ incidence and production patterns. Section 2 sets out the speciﬁc
factors model of production. Section 3 derives and characterizes the world equilibrium
3Anderson (2009) applies the speciﬁc factors production model to the two country homogeneous products
case with uniform trade costs, focusing on the comparative static eﬀect of globalization on income distribu-
tion. The present paper applies the same production model to many countries and diﬀerentiated products
with diﬀerentiated trade costs and focuses on characterizing cross section production and trade patterns as
well as income distribution. The general equilibrium comparative statics of the speciﬁc gravity model are
complex and left to future research.
4reduced form pattern of production and trade. Section 4 analyzes eﬃcient ex ante allocation
of speciﬁc factors facing random productivity draws in the world economy. Section 5 extends
the discussion to treat intermediate products trade and the implications of selection into
exporting. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix develops the endogenous determination of
varieties in monopolistic competition, and ﬁlls out the connection of the model with the
Costinot-Komunjer model. It also reviews selection into exporting.
1 TFP Frictions, Incidence and General Equilibrium
Each country produces and distributes goods to its trading partners. Production for given
resources is reduced from its maximal potential by a (Hicks neutral) productivity deﬂator
a
j
k ≥ 1 for product k in country j. Thus for product k in country j, a
j
k − 1 more factors are
used than needed with the ideal practice. Distribution to destination h requires additional
factors to be used, in the proportion T
jh
k − 1 to their use in production: the metaphor of
iceberg-melting distribution costs.








k, where e p
j
k is the unit cost of production
using ideal practice, or the ‘eﬃciency unit cost’. The a’s and T’s thus combine in a bilateral






k that contains both distribution and productivity
frictions. This useful simpliﬁcation is exploited everywhere in what follows.4
The TFP friction in each sector k for each origin j is the appropriate aggregator of {t
jh
k }
across destinations for delivery h. Let y
jh
k denoted delivered product k from j to destination
h. The appropriate aggregator ¯ t
j
k is derived as follows. Let gj(e pj,vj) be the maximum value































4The decomposition of t into T’s and a’s is always available, but mostly a distraction here. The metaphor
of iceberg melting trade costs extends to productivity frictions that ‘melt’ resources before the shipments
begin their journey to market.
5where vj is the endowment vector, f
j
k is a degree one homogeneous concave production
function and v
j
k is the vector of inputs in sector k. The ﬁrst order conditions imply that
the t’s disappear as active arguments in the GDP function. Sectoral TFP friction is de-



























k . This is equal to the ratio of GDP at delivered prices to the value
of output at factory gate eﬃciency unit prices.
TFP measurement takes eﬃciency unit prices e p
j
k as given. While conceptually clean
and useful for analyzing productivity, TFP is misleading for purposes of understanding
comparative economic performance and the pattern of production and trade. Proposition
1 below shows that real incomes depend on aggregate sellers’ incidence while Proposition 3
shows that sectoral GDP shares are decreasing in sectoral sellers’ incidence.
The key building block is incidence decomposition and aggregation at the sectoral level
using the properties of the structural gravity model. Like sectoral TFP friction ¯ t
j
k, bilateral
frictions are aggregated, but using only their sellers’ incidence portion. Buyers’ incidence
of bilateral frictions is similarly aggregated. The standard partial equilibrium one good
incidence analysis breaks the trade friction t into sellers’ incidence Π and buyers’ incidence
P with t = ΠP. The decomposition uses the hypothetical frictionless equilibrium price p∗
such that with actual equilibrium volume and buyers’ price p and sellers’ price e p, e pΠ = p∗
and p = p∗P.
The structural gravity model yields a set of Π
j
k’s and P h
k ’s such that if the actual trade





k }, all total shipments at delivered
value Y
j
k and all total expenditures at delivered value Eh
k would remain constant while the
bilateral shipments would shift to their frictionless equilibrium values (given the Y ’s and
E’s). It is thus a proper generalization of the partial equilibrium incidence analysis. The
Appendix reviews the details.
With eﬃciency unit production cost e p
j
k in country j, it is as if there was an average
6(‘world’) destination price for goods k delivered from j, p
j




k. Similarly, on the demand
side it is as if a single composite good k shipped to h from a world market at markup
P h
k . Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) call Π’s and P’s outward and inward multilateral
resistances, respectively.
Total shipments and expenditures are taken as given in the calculation of Π’s and P’s in
conditional general equilibrium. The full general equilibrium requires that the allocations of
resources (resulting in Y ’s) and expenditure at the upper level (E’s) for given incidences be
consistent with the allocations (Y ’s and E’s) that generate those same incidences in the lower
level. The separation into intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral modules is valid if the structure
is trade separable.
Trade separability requires a separable structure on demand and supply sides of the
world economy along with iceberg trade costs. On the demand side, each product group
k has a natural aggregator with aggregate price index P h
k for country h. P h
k is used for
the price index as well as the buyers’ incidence here because in equilibrium they are the
same. Expenditure across groups is allocated with the expenditure function e(P h
1 ,...,P h
M,uh),
concave and homogeneous of degree one in the P’s. On the supply side, aggregate production
in each sector is allocated across trade partners with perfect substitutability, so each sector’s










On the supply side, Y
j








k is the GDP share in j accounted for by good
k and g
j
k ≡ ∂gj/∂e p
j
k.


















Given the prices, (1) is solved for the real incomes uj,∀j.
General equilibrium requires meeting the system of budget constraints (1), the consis-
5This assumption can be relaxed to allow imperfect substitutability among the destinations, but this
relaxation is inessential for present purposes.
7tency requirements between upper and lower level allocations Y
j









k ,∀(k,h), and the sectoral market clearance requirements imposed in Appendix equa-
tions (24)-(25).
Impose CES preferences on the sub-expenditure functions, consistent with the structural
gravity model. The CES price index P h

















k)1−σk is a quality parameter for goods from j in class k6 and σk is the elasticity of
substitution parameter for class k.





























It simpliﬁes the model inconsequentially to assume the upper level preferences are Cobb-
Douglas, so that θh




equal to θkeh in the Cobb-Douglas case.




















h = 0, (3)
∀k,j. Substituting in (2), (3) determines the set of eﬃciency unit costs, e p
j
k, one for each k
and j. (3) is homogeneous of degree zero in e p’s, understanding that the P’s are homogeneous
6In monopolistic competition models, (β
j
k)1−σk is endogenous, equal to the proportion of all varieties of
class k that are produced by j. See the Appendix for a full treatment.
8of degree one in the unit costs in their representation as CES cost of living indexes. Thus
relative unit costs only are determined.
Using the structural gravity methods of the Appendix, incidence is inferred from observed




k while θkgh = Eh
k
(imposing balanced trade). Connecting from gravity back to (3), the Appendix shows that
the complex second term on the left hand side of (3) that describes the actual allocation of
goods to destinations can be replace with a much simpler term representing a hypothetical
























k)1−σk is recognized as the CES share equation for a hypothetical
world market where buyers face a uniform markup on e p
j
k, and the adding up constraint on












k, replace Yk with θk
P








h gh for the second
term on the left of (3) and divide through by
P
j gh. Deﬁne ωj≡gj/
P
j gj, the world GDP













(4) implies that sellers’ incidence of TFP frictions on average reduces the equilibrium
eﬃciency unit prices e p
j
k. The global equilibrium decomposes into a set of national equation
systems (4). gj is convex in e pj. It can be shown that e pj is negatively associated with Πj,
in the sense that e pj0[dln e pj + ((σk − 1)/σk))dlnΠj] = 0.7 Pushing the interpretation of the
preceding expression harder, the ‘average’ elasticity of e p’s with respect to Π’s is between 0
and −1, as it would be in a partial equilibrium analysis of (4). Finally, the convexity of the
7Impose the normalization of prices
P








k)−σkθk. Diﬀerentiate this system totally with respect to e pj and Πj. Multiplying the
diﬀerential vector by e pj and utilizing homogeneity properties of gj, e pj0gj
pp = 00. Then the inner product
yields the expression above.
9GDP function implies that dyj · de pj ≥ 0, so higher sellers’ incidence Π tends in some loose
average way to induce lower supply looking across sectors.
In contrast to the very limited insight available from general technology, something like
partial equilibrium reasoning is valid in a special case of the speciﬁc factors model that may
stand in for approximate validity in a wider class of neoclassical production models for which
the full eﬀects of simultaneous determination of prices in (4) precludes sharp results.
2 The Speciﬁc Factors Model
Unskilled labor is intersectorally mobile but in ﬁxed supply to the economy. The sector
speciﬁc factor can be regarded for all purposes of analysis in this section and the next as an
aggregate of many types of factors that form a separable group in the production function,
including a variety of skilled labor types and capital. But for simplicity of exposition, reduce
this aggregate to a single factor, skilled labor. Skilled workers are in ﬁxed total supply to the
economy prior to their acquisition of sector speciﬁc skills, after which they are in ﬁxed supply
to each sector. Section 4 treats the allocation decision. Both factors are internationally
immobile. Deliveries are to ﬁnal demand only until Section 5 introduces intermediate goods.
To ease notational clutter, the country superscript is suppressed where possible.
Supply is deﬁned as the activity y
j






















where fkj is a concave homogeneous of degree one potential production function giving the
activity level of the ideal technology. Labor L
j




More restrictive production functions serve several important modeling purposes. Assum-
ing identical production functions across sectors and countries (up to a productivity scalar
10a) ensures that the fully eﬃcient equilibrium will be Ricardian (because the equilibrium
relative factor intensities will be identical), and thus the model will nest the Eaton-Kortum
and Costinot-Komunjer models. Imposing Cobb-Douglas structure on f(·) results in a closed
form solution for g with very convenient properties. First, aggregate factor shares are stable,
consistent with observed nearly constant shares across periods of time when the composition
of GDP has altered tremendously. Second, Stolper-Samuelson forces are shut down: the av-
erage skill premium is independent of international forces in the model. This is analytically
convenient for thinking about a world in which skill premia seem to be rising simultane-
ously in both rich and poor countries. Third, the GDP function has a constant elasticity of
transformation. Finally, when extending the interpretation to include many types of sector
speciﬁc factors it is more natural to impose that the natural aggregator is the same in each
sector. Temporarily, it eases notation to drop the country superscript.
Let K =
P
k Kk and let fk = Lα
kK
1−α












and λk = Kk/K, the proportionate allocation of speciﬁc capital to sector k.8 GDP is the
product of real activity in production and distribution R = LαK1−α and the real activity
deﬂator G. G is convex and homogeneous of degree one in the eﬃciency unit costs, the e p’s.
The elasticity of transformation is equal to α/(1−α), the ratio of labor’s share to capital’s
share.9 The GDP share for any good k is given by:








8Solve the labor market clearance condition for the equilibrium wage, then use the Cobb-Douglas property
wL/α = g.
9The CET form is commonly used in applied general equilibrium modeling. The micro-foundations
provided here may prove useful in this context.
113 World Trade Equilibrium
The equilibrium is solved for the speciﬁc factors Cobb-Douglas case by using (7) to substitute
for s
j
k in the market clearance equations (4).
3.1 Equilibrium Prices





















kj θk and ηk ≡ α + σk(1 − α) > 1 in the empirically relevant case σk > 1.
(8) implies that equilibrium eﬃciency unit costs are increasing in the demand side driver
D
j




k)σk−1. Intuitively, bigger country size
ωj and bigger sectoral allocations of speciﬁc factors λ
j
k reduce unit costs. Also, the higher
the incidence of productivity frictions Π
j
k, the lower must the unit cost be to compensate.
The GDP deﬂator Gj in the general equilibrium is the (multi-) factoral terms of trade. A
rise in the factoral terms of trade raises unit cost, all else equal.
The demand shifter D
j
k is the product of a k speciﬁc component θk reﬂecting tastes in
the global economy for good k and a national origin ‘quality’ parameter β
1−σk
kj reﬂecting
tastes within goods class k for varieties from origin j. In monopolistic competition, β
j
k is
endogenously determined by the entry of ﬁrms in zero proﬁt equilibrium.
The factoral terms of trade Gj are solved based on the equilibrium e p’s. The equilibrium




















Use the adding up condition on the shares (9). Next, deﬁne the parametric ‘real potential


























The natural normalization for the price system is
P
j GjRj = 1. Subject to the normalization
there is a unique solution because the right hand side of the sum of shares equation above
is decreasing in Gj.
























Λj is an eﬃciency measure analyzed further below. Gj is decreasing in Rj interpreted as
relative country size.10 In contrast, Gj is increasing in both absolute and relative Λj.11
Λj decomposes into two intuitive components: a measure of harm from j’s incidence of
TFP frictions and a measure of j’s eﬃciency of skill allocation, the λ’s. Aggregate incidence
of TFP friction is derived by equating the right hand side of (11) with the same function









where Λj(1) denotes evaluation with Π
j









10If the normalization is not imposed, (10) should be multiplied by [
P
k(Λj/Rj)1/σRj]1/(σ−1). This form
of the right hand sid of (10) implies that the equilibrium Gj is homogeneous of degree zero in {Rj} — a
scalar expansion of the world economy leaves all prices and shares unchanged.
11Extending the same analysis as in the previous footnote, Gj is homogeneous of degree 1/σ2(σ − 1) in
the Λ’s. All G’s and thus GDP’s rise in proportion with a uniform rise in eﬃciency.
12¯ Πj contrasts with aggregate TFP friction ¯ tj because sectoral incidence diﬀers from sectoral TFP frictions
and because the implicit functions diﬀer. Locally there is a close relationship because ∂ ln ¯ Πi/∂ lnΠi
k = si
k =
∂ ln¯ ti/∂ ln¯ ti
k.








The ﬁrst term on the right implies, intuitively, that eﬃciency falls as the incidence of TFP
frictions rises. Λj(1) measures the eﬃciency of matching λ’s to D’s relative to a frictionless
equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation of skilled labor to sectors analyzed in Section 4















k, so Λj(1) < 1. How far Λj(1) falls below 1 reﬂects aspects of possibly eﬃcient ex
ante allocation facing uncertain Π’s as well as the deviations of realized productivity draws
from expected draws. Thus the decomposition above is arbitrary in assigning an eﬃciency
meaning to Λj(1). Nevertheless, Λj has an unambiguous eﬃciency interpretation and ¯ Πj
also has a clear interpretation as an eﬃciency measure.
3.2 Equilibrium Income Patterns
The model yields strikingly simple links from the incidence of productivity frictions to the
equilibrium cross section pattern of aggregate real incomes, income distribution and the
pattern of production and trade.
Proposition 1 (a) The factoral terms of trade Gj is decreasing in the sellers’ incidence
of TFP frictions, increasing in the relative eﬃciency of allocation Λj(1) and decreasing in








(b) Real national income is increasing in eﬀective potential GDP Rj/¯ Πj and in the eﬃciency










Gj is decreasing in relative Rj due to the familiar eﬀect of country size on the terms of
trade. Real income is less-than-unit elastic in eﬀective country size Rh/¯ Πh for the same rea-
son. Also intuitive, allocative eﬃciency improves the factoral terms of trade. In equilibrium,
sellers’ and buyers’ incidences tend to be negatively correlated, so comparative static shifts
in their product are damped.
Proposition 1 suggests that gravity plays a powerful and previously unappreciated role in
accounting for comparative national economic performance. Incidence varies across countries
in ways that cannot be captured by partial equilibrium measures of geography. Sellers’
and buyers’ incidences each matter. Over time, even though geography is constant, its
incidence is endogenously shifting. Evidence from Anderson and Yotov (2008) suggests
weak or even negative correlation between buyers’ and sellers’ incidence and between the
incidence measures and TFP type measures of distribution frictions. Over time, Anderson
and Yotov report signiﬁcant changes in incidence despite constant gravity coeﬃcients, with
real income impact averaging around 1/3 of measured TFP over the same period.
Considering the eﬀect of unequal elasticities, something like Proposition 1 should continue
































where Gj is the equilibrium factoral terms of trade solved from adding up (9). Intuitively,
higher Π’s reduce G and less eﬃcient allocation of λ’s reduce G. These eﬀects carry through
to real incomes as in Proposition 1(b).
Equilibrium wages have simple patterns in the model. The unskilled wage (using w = gL)











The national average return to skills is ¯ rj = g
j
K. Based on the preceding discussion,
Proposition 2 (a) Unskilled wages are increasing in the skilled to unskilled endowment
ratio. The average skill returns are decreasing in the same ratio. Both factor incomes are
increasing in the relative eﬃciency of sector speciﬁc allocations, and decreasing in country
size. (b) The average skill premium ¯ rj/wj −1 = [(1−α)/(α)](Kj/Lj)α−1 −1 is independent
of international forces.
The preceding algebra does not require nonzero bilateral trade ﬂows.13 For present pur-
poses, this property means that substitution on the extensive margin between traded and
nontraded goods plays no central role but occurs in the background.
Proposition 2 (b) is a useful neutrality property of the model with respect to income
distribution. In contrast, the distribution of sector speciﬁc factor incomes is powerfully








the properties of the special Cobb-Douglas GDP function to yield
r
j








The properties of the national average returns to skill, ¯ rj, are given above. The sector speciﬁc
part of the preceding expression will be developed following the analysis of equilibrium
production shares.
13Section 5 validates this claim in the presence of traded inputs and selection into trade.
163.3 Equilibrium Production and Trade Patterns














As compared to (9), (12) eliminates the eﬀect of country size on the equilibrium pattern of
production. Replacing Λj with Λj(1)(¯ Πj)1−σ in (12):
Proposition 3 In the equal elasticities case (with σ > 1) and uniform Cobb-Douglas
production functions, the equilibrium production share is
1. increasing in the capital allocation share λ
j
k;
2. increasing in the demand ‘parameter’ D
j
k; and
3. decreasing in the relative sectoral incidence of inverse TFP Π
j
k/¯ Πj.
The negative association between shipment shares and Π’s of Proposition 3.3 helps explain
the same empirical ﬁnding of Anderson and Yotov. They oﬀer complementary causation
ﬂowing from given shares to the Π’s for the special case of uniform border barriers.
Sector speciﬁc factor returns can now be characterized drawing on Proposition 3. Using
(12) and r
j

















Then using Λj = Λj(1)¯ Π1−σ:
Proposition 2 (c)-(d) Sector speciﬁc factor returns are increasing in the national labor
to human capital endowment ratio, decreasing in the sector speciﬁc allocation, decreasing
in the relative sectoral incidence of TFP frictions and increasing in the sectoral demand
parameter. (d) The distribution of skill premia is more dispersed the more ineﬃcient is the
sectoral allocation of human capital.
(13) summarizes the properties of the inequality of speciﬁc factor returns in global equi-
librium. Technology shocks aﬀect the Π’s primarily (exclusively under Cobb-Douglas upper
17level preferences so that D
j
k is parametric.) Then for given allocations of skills, more disper-
sion of the incidence of productivity induces more ex post inequality.
The reduced form unit cost equations simplify when σk = σ. Using (11) in (10), substi-














Using the decomposition Λj = Λj(1)(¯ Πj)1−σ, the implications of (14) for equilibrium ‘com-
petitiveness’ in the cross section, interpreted as determinants of e p
j
k’s, are intuitive and sharp:
Proposition 4 In the uniform elasticities case:
1. larger speciﬁc endowments lower costs;
2. larger world demand for a good raises its cost;
3. higher quality costs more;
4. higher sectoral sellers incidence of TFP frictions lowers unit costs;
5. bigger countries have lower costs.
6. higher national average sellers’ incidence raises unit costs while better eﬃciency of
allocation lowers unit costs.
Proposition 4.3 states that in general equilibrium, higher quality goods have higher unit
costs, all else equal. This is less obvious than it might seem. The CES model of preferences
implies that some of each variety will be demanded, so it is not true that lower quality must
have a lower price to be purchased by anyone.14
With unequal elasticities, (8) applies. Proposition 4 still applies for given Gj, with
additional eﬀects arising through eﬀects of the exogenous variables on Gj. Compared to
14The interpretation of β
1−σk
kj as a quality parameter is natural from examining the sub-utility function that
lies behind the CES expenditure function: starting from equal consumption of each variety, the consumer’s
willingness to pay is higher the larger is β
1−σk
kj .
18(8), the special case (14) implies that larger countries have uniformly lower unit production
costs.
The model yields strong restrictions on the equilibrium pattern of trade. The ratio of
net exports to GDP is given by s
j
k −θk in the Cobb-Douglas preferences case. Gross exports
are more interesting. Production is given by s
j
kgj. Own demand is given by (26). The ratio





















Imposing Cobb-Douglas upper level preferences, E
j
k/Yk is replaced with ωj. Using ωj =






















Proposition 5 With equal elasticities the ratio of sectoral gross exports to GDP is in-
creasing in s
j
k, which moves according to Proposition 3. For given s
j
k, sectoral gross exports











and global GDP share ωj which
itself is
1. increasing in allocative eﬃciency Λj(1) and
2. increasing in eﬀective relative country size Rj/¯ Πj.
The term Constructed Home Bias is coined by Anderson and Yotov (2008). It summarizes
the implications of gravity for the prominent empirical regularity called home bias.
Proposition 5 combined with Proposition 2 (c) implies that export intensity is positively
correlated with sectoral earnings premia, a well documented empirical regularity in rich and
poor countries alike. For sharper results in a speciﬁc factors continuum model, see Anderson
(2009).
194 Equilibrium Speciﬁc Factor Allocation
The speciﬁc factor allocations are presumably determined by optimizing behavior. Invest-
ments in sectors become speciﬁc once made, but are allocated from a given stock K so as
to equalized anticipated returns. It is useful to consider the fully eﬃcient equilibrium before
proceeding to the more realistic equilibrium where investments are ex ante eﬃcient but ex
post ineﬃcient due to the realizations of the productivity draws. This section concludes with
discussion of allocation of multiple sector speciﬁc factors.
4.1 Fully Eﬃcient Equilibrium
An instructive benchmark is the special case model when the speciﬁc factors are fully ef-
ﬁciently allocated. This arises if the speciﬁc factor becomes mobile; or equivalently, if the
incidence of trade and productivity frictions is perfectly anticipated by agents selecting the
speciﬁc factor investments. The identical Cobb-Douglas production function structure as-
sumed here makes the production set eﬀectively Ricardian when capital allocation adjusts
eﬃciently.15 Due to the love of variety structure of preferences, prices adjust in equilibrium
to support diversiﬁcation, avoiding the corner solutions that otherwise arise with Ricardian
production.

















Supply adjusts to meet demand in absence of trade and productivity frictions. Trade and
productivity frictions captured by the Π’s redistribute sales through a CES structure, but
the mechanism of an essentially demand driven equilibrium pattern of production remains.
15The Ricardian production set is the outer envelope of speciﬁc factor production sets for ﬁxed sectoral
allocations.











































k)1−σ. This yields the solution in the text.
20Paralleling this feature, with eﬃcient allocation the unit costs of (14) become invariant to
k: e p
j







librium national shares of world sales in each sector k are given by Y
j





The speciﬁc gravity model takes the β’s as given, while the Eaton-Kortum model endog-
enizes them. The connection between the two models is seen as follows. Using the preceding




k)1−σ and substituting back into the gravity equation (26), the
















For any sector, the Eaton-Kortum assumptions result in equilibrium β’s such that the right
hand side above is replaced with a gravity expression equivalent to (26), only with 1 − σ
replaced by −ν where ν is the dispersion parameter of the Frechet distribution. (See Eaton
and Kortum, equation (11).) Demand side forces in the Eaton-Kortum model disappear into
a constant term that cancels in equilibrium trade shares. Substitution is all on the extensive
margin. In contrast, the Armington structure forces diversiﬁed production in each country
by assuming that goods are diﬀerentiated by place of origin. Substitution is on the intensive
margin. The distribution of the productivity penalties, the a’s, is unrestricted.
The Costinot-Komunjer extension of Eaton-Kortum to combine deterministic sector/country
productivity with variety speciﬁc productivity draws from Frechet distributions results in the
assignment of proportions of varieties within sectors as in Eaton-Kortum along with the as-
signment of sectoral allocations. The Appendix expands on the connection between the
generalized Ricardian and speciﬁc factors models by analyzing monopolistic competition
equilibrium when skill allocation is subsequent to productivity realizations.
The diﬀerence between the speciﬁc gravity and Eaton-Kortum/Costinot-Komunjer mod-
els is the speciﬁcity of skilled labor. Frechet distributions of productivity draws do not yield
closed form predictions when factors are speciﬁc. Nevertheless, as preceding sections show,
21useful predictions about the pattern of production and trade can be made taking the λ’s and
β’s as given.
Suppose that the productivity of distribution and production is random.17 Investments
in sectors must be made prior to the realization of the random variables, at which time the
realized sector speciﬁc returns diﬀer. Ex ante eﬃcient equilibrium with risk neutral agents
is characterized by equal expected rates of return.18


















Simplify by assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences for choice between sectors, hence D
j
k is a


































Note that since the right hand side is convex in Π, riskier sectors receive more investment all
else equal, by Jensen’s Inequality. Intuitively, this occurs because r
j
k is inversely related to
Π
j
k and thus is increased in expected value by mean preserving spreads in the distribution of
Π
j
k. Of course, considerations of risk aversion, risk sharing and covariation of the Π’s modify
any such conclusions based on (17).
An empirically tractable form of the share equation emerges from considerations of ex
17Evidence from Anderson and Yotov (2008) indicates that bilateral trade costs T
jh
k are remarkably stable
over time, while in contrast the sectoral productivity penalties a
j
k and the multilateral resistances Π
j
k appear
to have signiﬁcant randomness.
18There are important resource allocation implications of risk aversion, but these carry much additional
complexity. Helpman and Razin (1978) develop the implications of international trade in securities in this
setting when there is aggregate risk.
22ante eﬃciency in monopolistic competition equilibrium. Realized D’s diﬀer from ex post
eﬃcient equilibrium (including rational expectations) D’s by a white noise error term. The























where the d’s are ﬁxed eﬀects and the ’s are realizations of a unit mean random error that
is orthogonal to the other terms. The orthogonality property is due to the assumption of ex
ante eﬃcient allocation.
Now consider the implications of randomness for the eﬃciency of allocation given ex
ante eﬃciency.Taking expectations of (11), the convexity of Λ in Π guarantees that riskier
incidence lowers eﬃciency for a given allocation. Moving to a risk-reducing allocation helps
to oﬀset this but cannot fully do so. Moreover, variance plausibly rises with the mean, in
which case higher average incidence of trade and productivity frictions imposes an added
burden through greater expected ex post ineﬃciency of allocation. In empirical exercises
the λ∗’s can be calculated and compared to actual λ’s to decompose the ineﬃciency due to
randomness into its avoidable and unavoidable components.
The full rational expectations equilibrium of the model requires that the expectations of
Π’s be equal to the expectations of the realized Π’s obtained from (24)-(25) subject to (23).
Multiple speciﬁc factors introduce no new elements, with the minor exception that there
may be diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of allocation of the diﬀerent factors. The multiple speciﬁc
factors form a natural aggregate, a concave and homogeneous of degree one function φ:
K = φ(K1,...,KM) where the superscript now refers to the speciﬁc factor type. Sectoral
allocations yield φk = φ(λ1
kK1,...,λM
k KM). Then λkK = Kk = φk as before with λk being
the exact index of allocations λk ≡ φk/φ. If all M speciﬁc factor types follow the same
allocation rules, then multiple goods make no diﬀerence at all. But it is plausible that some
factors follow diﬀerent allocation rules (e.g., risk neutrality may be appropriate for some
23types of plant and equipment investment but implausible for human capital), in which case
the structure of the index λk plays a role. Multiple speciﬁc factors of course also introduce
richer ex post income distributions.
5 Intermediate Inputs and the Extensive Margin
Intermediate products trade comprises a large and growing share of world trade. A simple
extension of the speciﬁc factors model of production encompasses intermediate products
trade.
Vertical disintegration is apparent — an increasing share of components are imported,
meaning some formerly potential trade becomes active. In the multi-country context, similar
shifts in the qualitative pattern of trade arise as more of the potential bilateral trade links
are activated by the choice of ﬁrms to initiate trade. The action on the extensive margin of
trade introduced here also applies to ﬁnal goods trade.
5.1 Speciﬁc Factors Production with Intermediates
Intermediate products enter for simplicity as just a single intermediate product, potentially
produced as a variety at each location.19 The CES aggregate of the varieties is an input into
production of all ﬁnal goods and the intermediate good at each location. To ease notation,









where Mk is the quantity of the CES aggregate intermediate input used in sector k and
sector m is the intermediate goods production sector.
Let Pm denote the price of the intermediate input used by the home country, a CES
aggregate of the intermediate products purchased from all trading origins. Cost mini-
19The methods used here readily scale up to any number of intermediate product classes.
24mization combines with the labor market clearance condition to yield the GDP function













Here, c is a constant term combining the parameters, while e pk is the ‘eﬃciency unit cost’ of
output in sector k. For some sector k = m, e pm is the eﬃciency unit price of the intermediate
product from sector m produced in the home country.
P j
m is the buyers’ incidence in j of intermediate goods, a CES price aggregate for country
j of the elements of the vector {e pi
mtij
m/Πi
m}. All the earlier procedures for multilateral
resistance apply. Higher buyers’ incidence of TFP in intermediate inputs lowers GDP while
lower sellers’ incidence of intermediate products raises GDP.
Due to the separability of the GDP function, the reduced form equilibrium eﬃciency
prices and production shares are independent of the incidence of trade costs on intermediate
inputs Pm. This separability implies that all the production, trade and income distribution
pattern results of Section 3 apply in the presence of intermediate goods.
Aggregate incidence of inverse TFP with intermediate products of the type modeled here











Evaluate this expression with the reduced form e p’s of (8) evaluated at the actual Π’s and
at a uniform ¯ Π that yields the same value of the expression. The equilibrium inverse TFP
incidence measure has the same form as in Proposition 1 except that α is replaced with
α0 = α + ν. A rise in buyer’s incidence for the intermediate goods Pm lowers productivity
with elasticity −ν/(1−ν) given by the expression above. The key property is that ﬁnal and
intermediate productivity frictions decompose neatly due to the Cobb-Douglas structure of
the model.
255.2 The Extensive Margin, Productivity and Trade Patterns
The production function for each industry k is comprised of the production functions of
those ﬁrms that earn non- negative proﬁts. The ﬁrms choose to enter production, commit
a skilled labor force and then receive a Hicks-neutral productivity draw from a probability
distribution. Those ﬁrms unlucky enough to receive draws too low to allow breaking even exit
from production. The average productivity in industry k, 1/¯ ak, is determined by the cutoﬀ
productivity of the marginal ﬁrm in combination with the parameters of the productivity
draw distribution. Average productivity is for present purposes taken as given.
Proﬁts are earned by inframarginal ﬁrms, and form part of the rents earned by the sector
speciﬁc factors.20 The average productivity is associated with an average price, a constant
markup over the the average unit cost of extant ﬁrms. See Melitz (2003) for details. The
Melitz model diﬀers in having only one factor of production, but the essentials remain the
same, illustrated in the Appendix development of the monopolistic competition model. This
setup allows aggregation of the heterogeneous ﬁrm model into a representative ﬁrm model
easily linked to the general equilibrium production theory of preceding sections.
The second key contribution of Melitz is to introduce a second cutoﬀ due to ﬁxed costs
of exporting. Expanding the iceberg metaphor, part of the iceberg shears oﬀ and is lost as
it leaves the home glacier, the remainder melting as it travels to its destination. There are
two consequences for the allocation of trade and a further consequence for the allocation
of resources. As for trade, some (many in practice) trade links are shut down completely
because no ﬁrm exports, and secondly, ﬁrm selection contributes to trade volume in active
links. As for resource allocation, ﬁrms choosing to export must hire additional unskilled
workers to meet the ﬁxed cost.21 The resulting rise in the wage raises the cost of production
for all ﬁrms. Now the conditions of trade have an eﬀect on average productivity: lowering
20The division of rents between ‘owners’ and skilled workers is irrelevant to present purposes.
21If skilled workers are not completely ﬁrm speciﬁc, ﬁrms can also hire skilled workers within their sector
with some loss of skills. The implications of this Darwinian force in the sectoral skilled labor market is
developed further in Anderson (2009).
26the variable cost of trade induces more ﬁrms to incur the ﬁxed cost of trade and raises the
average productivity of all surviving ﬁrms.
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) develop the implications of ﬁxed costs of export
for bilateral trade and the gravity model. For present purposes, note that the eﬀect of action
on the extensive margin is isolated in the multilateral resistance terms, Π
j
k for outputs and
P j
m for inputs in country j and sector k. The Appendix develops the implications of their
model for multilateral resistance.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a framework for integrating buyers’ and sellers’ incidence measures
of TFP in production and distribution into a many country general equilibrium model.
Diﬀerences in the incidence of TFP across goods and countries impact the cross section
pattern of production and trade, with sharp results for the special case of the speciﬁc factors
model.
Given buyers’ and sellers’ incidence measures for an appropriately disaggregated set of
goods, countries (and possibly years) the speciﬁc factors model has testable implications for
the pattern of production and trade. Deviations from predicted values may give useful clues.
The paper also points to future theoretical reﬁnement. The model links trade frictions to
income distribution, and points toward political economy, a link that appears worth exploring
in light of concerns about globalization causing inequality. The model also points toward
dynamics, as speciﬁc factors adjust.
The extreme simplicity of the model buys strong results, while hinting that the results
hold in less restrictive cases. The restrictive assumptions about distribution are especially
important to relax. The convention of gravity modeling is that the seller provides all the
distribution services, so these accrue as income to the seller and form part of the income
side of the budget constraint above. In reality, some distribution services are provided by
27buyers, hence GDP as modeled in this paper does not equal measured GDP. Moreover,
gravity measurement picks up trade costs that are implicit and thus do not correspond to
directly measurable trade costs, hence national product accounting deviates further from
the theoretical model here. A tractable alternative approach that preserves the qualitative
features of the present model is to treat distribution services as an intermediate input. More
general treatments may still be tractable.
Finally, the analysis reveals important channels through which technology shocks in pro-
duction and in distribution in one country are transmitted to the incidence of productivity in
all trading partners. The speciﬁc factors structure suggests gradual adjustment to long run
equilibrium. Future research might proﬁtably explore these channels for their implications
about inference of productivity and about the international transmission of shocks.
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308 Appendix
8.1 Sectoral Incidence
On the supply side, for the moment take as given the national output of each sector, and
its allocation to all destinations. The value of shipments at delivered prices from origin h in


























































Divide numerator and denominator of the right hand side of (21) by total shipments of k
















The right hand side is the global expenditure share for class k goods from country j. The
left hand side is a ‘global behavioral expenditure share’, understanding that the CES price










1−σk = 1. (23)
31The implication of (22) is that eﬀectively each origin j ships to a world market with
incidence of trade costs Π
j
k. The incidence of trade costs to sellers being given by the Π’s,





taking away the sellers’ incidence. The average incidence of all bilateral costs to h from the
various origins j is given by the buyers’ price index P h
k . The buyers’ incidence is obtained
by substituting for quality adjusted eﬃciency unit costs from (21) in the deﬁnition of the





































These two sets of equations jointly determine the inward multilateral resistances, the P’s
and the outward multilateral resistances, the Π’s, given the expenditure and supply shares
and the bilateral trade costs, subject to the normalization (23). A normalization of the Π’s is
needed to determine the P’s and Π’s because (24)-(25) determine them only up to a scalar.22
See Anderson and Yotov (2008) for analysis of the properties of multilateral resistance.
































by a power transform of the relative incidence of trade costs.
The relationship between the incidence of trade frictions and productivity frictions in the
22If {P0
k,Π0
k} is a solution to (24)-(25), then so is {λP0
k,Π0
k/λ} for any positive scalar λ; where Pk denotes
the vector of P’s and the superscript 0 denotes a particular value of this vector, and similarly for Πk.





k,∀k,j. The solution to (24)-(25) under the convenient normalization P 1





k,∀k,j, and P h
k = 1,∀k,h. All the incidence of productivity is borne on the supply
side. The reason is that in conditional general equilibrium the expenditure E
j
k on good
k from source j is given. With a fall in a
j
k, market clearance is achieved with a rise in
the eﬃciency unit cost, so that all the beneﬁt accrues to suppliers of k from j. The further
implication is that sectoral TFP is decomposable into a Hicks neutral production component
and an equilibrium distribution incidence component. It is important to keep in mind that
the comparative static incidence of a productivity improvement is still shared between buyer
and seller; this decomposition applies in the cross section.
8.2 Monopolistic Competition
The special form of monopolistic competition and trade that is the focus of most of the
literature has essentially no eﬀect on the equilibrium of the model for given allocations of
the speciﬁc factor. Endogenizing the allocation of the speciﬁc factor has the additional
important eﬀect of endogenizing the expenditure share parameters.
The CES preferences in each sector now contain a very large number of potential brands
produced by ﬁrms in each country. Each ﬁrm is a monopolistic competitor, marking up price
over cost by a constant proportion σ/(σ − 1). The GDP shares have exactly the same form
as in the text because diﬀering elasticities act on the model exactly like diﬀering technology
frictions and become part of the Π’s while common elasticities cancel out.
The development of a brand takes F units of skilled labor. The allocation of skilled labor








k is the number of ﬁrms in sector
k and country j. The allocation share of skilled labor net of development requirements is









The number of brands is determined in fully eﬃcient equilibrium by the zero proﬁt
23For allocations within sectors, only the relative multilateral resistances are relevant for allocation, so











k. Using the marginal revenue product functions
for skilled and unskilled labor for the Cobb-Douglas production function in the zero proﬁt






































(σ − 1)(1 + F)

. (27)









(σ − 1)2(1 + F)
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Thus the GDP function remains exactly the same as in the text, with the understanding
that Kj is replaced by the expression above for net skilled labor and λ’s are deﬁned as shares
of net skilled labor.












based on the Dixit-Stiglitz structure.
The eﬃcient allocation in a frictionless world is λ
j
k = θk,∀j,k. This follows from solving
(16) with the Π’s equal to one.







k and then replacing D
j

































(30) only holds (goods are produced) for goods with the same Π’s. The Π’s being en-
dogenous, describing the equilibrium is diﬃcult.
Eaton and Kortum resolve this diﬃculty by imposing a Frechet distribution on the a’s
that diﬀers nationally by a location parameter but has a common dispersion parameter.
Eaton and Kortum predict the proportion of varieties that will be produced and exported
in equilibrium by each country to each partner as a gravity equation. (See their equation
(11).) Costinot and Komunjer extend the Eaton-Kortum approach by adding a deterministic
country/sector speciﬁc component to productivity. Now the gravity model describes bilateral
trade patterns in any sector while the country/sector productivity component shifts the
country/sector production shares. Thus this generalized Ricardian approach is nested in the
speciﬁc gravity approach when the speciﬁc factor is allocated after the productivity draws.
Admitting productivity shocks that are not revealed prior to the allocation of skilled
labor, the eﬃcient allocation is solved from using (27) in (28) and then substituting the
result into (17). The pattern of production and trade predictions of the model remain those
of the text for given λ’s and D’s, while the explantion of the λ’s and D’s is deeply implicit. An
empirically tractable form of the share equation nevertheless emerges from considerations of
ex ante eﬃciency. Realized D’s diﬀer from ex post eﬃcient equilibrium (including rational
expectations) D’s by a white noise error term. Substituting the right hand side of (29)























where the f’s are ﬁxed eﬀects and the ’s are realizations of a unit mean random error that
is orthogonal to the other terms. The orthogonality property is due to the assumption of ex
35ante eﬃcient allocation.
8.3 Selection to Trade
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) derive the gravity model with selection. The ex-
position below reviews their model, and reformulates it to highlight the role of multilateral
resistance in both intensive and extensive margins. It eases notational clutter to suppress
the separate accounting for each goods class k, and to move the location indexes to the
subscript position.
The model of the preceding subsection applies to determine the number of ﬁrms that
enter, taken here as given along with the other variables of conditional general equilibrium.
The cost of a ﬁrm to serve its own market (assuming that tii = 1 for simplicity) is given
by e pi times ai, the inverse of the ﬁrm’s productivity draw. The aggregate expenditure at
destination j is Ej and the CES expenditure system allocates expenditure across origins.












Here, fij denotes the ﬁxed bilateral export cost. Extending the iceberg metaphor, f is
measured in uinits of the good, as if a chunk sheared oﬀ and was lost as the berg separated
from the mother glacier. Note that the markup cancels in the numerator and denominator
of the demand function facing the ﬁrm.






for aij ≥ aL while
Vij = 0
36otherwise. Here, F is the cumulative density function. The value of shipments to all desti-
nations from location i is denoted Yi.




































































1−σ = 1. (35)
The selection equation can be restated to highlight the role of multilateral resistance.







1−σEjyi/Y = fij. (36)
There are three implications. First, notice that the gravity model with selection combines
the eﬀects of trade costs on the intensive margin with their eﬀects on the extensive margin
acting through Vij. Higher ﬁxed costs reduce volume while larger markets draw more en-
trants. Second, σ plays a role in selection. Incorporating variation across goods class, lower
elasticity (higher markup) goods classes will have more ﬁrms selected into exporting, all
else equal. Third, most importantly, the multilateral resistance variables incorporate both
the productivity penalty imposed by the incidence of trade costs and the productivity gain
garnered by the incidence of selection into trade.
The formal model is completed by specifying a distribution function for G. With the










Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein estimate selection with a Probit regression, then use these
estimates to control for selection in the second stage gravity model regression with positive
trade ﬂows.
38